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RECENT CASES.
CARRIERS-INJURIES TO PASSENGERS-DEPOT PLATFORMS.-PITTSBURG, C.,
C. & ST. L. Ry. Co. v. HARRIS, 77 N. E. IOSI (IND.).-In an action for injuries
to a passenger by falling on an icy depot platform, instructions requiring the
carrier to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the operation of
its railroad in providing reasonably safe means for passengers to enter and
depart from its cars and depot, and declaring that a carrier of passengers is
held to the highest degree of care in taking aboard and discharging passen-
gers, and is liable for the slightest neglect, etc., held, were erroneous, as
imposing too high a degree of care.
Common carriers of passengers are required to do all that human sagacity
and foresight can do under the circumstances, in view of the character and
mode of conveyance adopted, to prevent accidents to passengers and are
responsible for any-even the slightest-negligence, Diabola v. Manhattan
Ry. Co., 8 N. Y. Supp. 334; Baltimore. & 0. R. Co. v. W, htma, 26 Am.
Rep. 384. The above cases would seem to impose a higher degree of care
than the one digested. However Chicago &- N. W. Ry. Co. v. Scates, go Ill-
586 holds that a railroad company is bound to do no more than to provide a
suitable platform, approaches, etc., at its depots and stations, and use ordi-
nary care. There are always arising a multitude of cases on the subject but
the prevailing view seems toibe in harmony with;this case. It is more logical
and consistent with sound reasoning. To require a railroad company to exer
cise this highest degree of care in keeping their station platforms and
approaches for the use of passengers in boarding and alighting from trains
would be manifestfinjustice, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cockerel, 33 S. W.
407.
CARRIERS-STREET RAILROADS-MISTAKE IN TRANSFE.-GEORGIA Ry. &
ELECTRIC Co. v. BAKER, 54 S. 639 (GA.).-Held, that the conductor of the sec-
ond car must at his peril determine the right of the passengers to ride upon
the transfer, notwithstanding it does not upon its face show such right.
The franchise of the street railway company may, or may not, require
the company to issue transfers to its passengers, but in both cases their effect
is the same. Indiana R. Co. v. Hoffman, 16i Ind. 573. The object of the
transfer being to secure an additional passage, upon its face it must clearly
indicate what that passage shall be. Tawshe v. Tacoma R., etc., Co., 70 Pac.
IIS (Wash.).
Against this view and, it seems, with the better reason, it is maintained
that the transfer is conclusive as to the right of the passenger to ride upon
the second car. Frederick v. Marquette, etc., -1. C o., 37 Mich. 342; Noror,
v. Consolidated Ry. Co., 79 Conn. IO9; Baldwin's Am. R. R. Law, p. 292.
Clearly there is a conflict of rights. Townsend v. New York, etc., R. Co., 5(
N. Y. 295, The passenger has a sufficient remedy upon breach of contract
Mosher v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 127 U. S. 39
o . To confine him to thit
relief would only enforce the rights of the company; Bradshaw v. Souty
Boston R. Co., 135 Mass. 407; and respect the element of public interes
involved. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell, 112 Ill. 295. See Comment ante
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CRIMINAL LAw-NEw TRIAL-NEwLY DiscovxRED EVIDNCE.-STATE V.
LILLISTON, 54 SO. E. 427 (N. C.).-Held, that in a criminal case, a motion for
a new trial would not be granted by the Supreme Court, to enable the defend-
ant to produce evidence which he had in possession at the time of the trial but
withheld from the jury. Connor and Walker, JJ., dissenting.
In the great majority of our states the doctrine is well established.that in
the absence of any constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary it is the
exclusive province of the court to determine all questions of law that arise in
criminal prosecutions. Sfiarf v. U. S., 156 U. S. 5i; State v. Elwood, 73 N.
C. 189. As a general rule a new trial will be granted, if since the former trial
new evidence has been found which would in all probability have changed the
result of the trial. Simmons v. Mann, 72 N. Car. 12; Husted v. Mead, 58
Ct. 55. But facts which are within the knowledge of the defendant at the
trial and are not put in evidence as in this case, do not constitute new evidence
and are not grounds for a new trial. Heard Civil Pleading, p. 82; Tilley v.
State, 55 Ga. 557; Peofile v. Cesena, 90 Cal. 38r. In criminal actions the
Supreme Court of any state, in the absence of any constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, is limited to a review and correction of errors of law
committed in the trial below. Carson v,. Dellinger, 90 N. C. 226; Sumrion
V. Mann, 92 N. C. 12.
EVIDENCE-OFFER OF COMPROMISE.-FINN V. NEw ENGLAND TELEPHONE &
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 64 ATLANTIC 490 (MAINE).-Held, that the admissability
or non-admissability of evidence offered to prove an alleged compromise
depends upon the intention of the party seeking it. If he intends his offer to
be- a compromise settlement it is inadmissable. If he intends it to be an
admission of liability, coupled with an endeavor to settle such liability, then it
is admissible to prove such liability.
The general rule seems be to that a written offer to compromise, it being
on its face an offer to compromise the case, is not admissable. Tufts v.
DeBignon, 6i Ga. 322. Admissions of a party, when made for the purpose of
effecting a compromise of the matter in dispute, should be excluded as evi-
dence, on the ground of public policy. Rockefeller v. Newcomb, 57 Ill. I86.
But it is held that no part of an offer to compromise is admissable if it is
expressly stated to be made without prejudice. White v. Old Dominion
Steamshif Co., 102 N. Y. 66o; Tennant v. Dudley, I44 N. Y. 504. Some
courts have held that while an offer of compromise, as such, is inadmissable,
statements of independent facts are admissable against the party making
them. Chafe et al v. Mackenzie, 43 La. Ann. IO62; Rose v. Rose, 112 Cal.
3411; Garner et al v. Myrick et al, 30 Miss. 448. It is held in some jurisdic-
tions that an offer of compromise is not admissable, either as evidence of a
fact from which the liability of the party making the offer may be inferred, or
as an admission of such liability. Sherber v. Piser 6.5 Yenney, 26 0 St.
476. Statements not admissable for any purpose if made in offer of com-
promise. Robertson v. Blair, 56 S. C. 96; Johnson v. Wilson, I Pinn. 65,
(Wise.).
EVIDENcE-REs GXsvr-INJRIS TO SIRVANT.-So. IND. R. R. Co. v.
OSBORNE, 78 N. E. 248 (IND.).-Held that in an action for injuries the defend-
ant was not harmed by the admission of the declaration against interest made
by its agent, an engineer, forty-five minutes after the accident. Wiley J., dis-
senting.
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It is a well-established rule of law in the United States that when a decla-
ration against interest is made by an agent which is unquestionably subse-
quent both as to time and casual relation, such declaration is inadmissable.
Williams v. Cambridge R. R. Co., 144 Mass., 148; Packet Co. vt. Clough, 20
Wall. (U. S.) 528. But if the declaration is subsequent in time, while in point
of casual relation to the main act substantially contemporaneous, as occurs in
this case, it will be admitted in some states and rejected in others. The
weight of modern authority, however, favors the relaxation of this rule, when
the declaration by the agent is undesigned and spontaneous. Hufcut on-
Agency, Ed. 2, p. 184; Olive, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stein, 133 Ind. 243; Hermes
v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 8o Wis. 59 o . Yet this case does not necessarily
favor this rule, since its admission is harmless, inasmuch as facts sought to be
shown have been, otherwise, fully and properly established. Webb v. Bar-
ling, 8i U. S. 406; Gray v'. Borrough of Danbury, 54 Conn. 574. It seems,
however, in the southern and eastern states, and in the U. S. Supreme Court,
such declarations made by railroad conductors, engineers, etc., as to the acci-
dent are generally excluded. Southerland v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co.,
zo6 N. C. ioo; Furst v. 2nd Ave. R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. Io6; Vicksburg,
etc., R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, iig U. S. 99.
HOMICIE-SELF-DEFENsE-DuTY To RETRET.-HILL V. STATE, 41 So. 621
(ALA.).-Held, that the plaintiff should have retreated if thereby he could
have avoided the necessity of taking the life of the decedent
Upon this question the authorities are by no means uniform. This case
follows the common law doctrine and the English rule as expressed by Black-
stone, Volume IV, p. 185; and as declared by several states, that homicide is
justifiable only when every means of escape has been exhausted. State v.
Walker, 9 Honst 464 (Del.); Compton v. State, xio Ala. 24. Other states,
and it sens with the greater weight of authority, hold that the party whose
person is unlawfully attacked is not bound to retreat in order to avoid the
necessity of killing his assailant. State v. Bartlett, 178 Mo. 658; State v.
Sherman, i6 R. I. 631; Beard v. N. S., 158 N. S. 550. The reason for the
more lenient construction now placed upon the strict requirement of the
common law may be attributed to the introduction of fire arms and the recog-
nition by courts that self-defense should not be distorted into self-destruc-
tion by the unreasonable requirements of the duty to retreat Duncan v.
State, 49 Ark. 543.
INFANTS-CONTRACTs-FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO AGE-EFFECT.-
COMMANDER V. BRAZIL, 41 SOUTHERN 497 (Miss.).-Held, an infant who,
after reaching the stage of maturity indicating that he is of full age, enters
into a contract falsely representing himself to be of age and accepts the bene-
fits thereof, is estopped from denying that he is not of age when the con-
tract is sought to be enforced against him; the party dealing with him believ-
ing him of full age.
The question here involved has long been a much mooted question
in the various jurisdictions of this country. And although the courts
have by no means been harmonious in their conclusions the weight of
authority on this point is well defined. At law, the fraud of an infant iii
falsely representing himself to be of age and so inducing another to contract
with him, does not estop him from pleading his infancy if sued upon the *on-
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tract Studwell v. Shapter, 54 N. Y. 249; Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300.
Contra by statute, Dillon v. Burnham, 43 Kan. 77. By so doing, however,
the infant will in many jurisdictions incur a liability for deceit. Fitts v. Hall,
9 N. H. 44i; Wallace v. Marss, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 391. Contra Nash v. Jewitt,
61 Vt 5o7; Slayton v. Barry, x75 Mass. 513. In equity, however, where the
infant has falsely represented his age, or taken active steps to conceal it and
has thereby induced the other party to enter into the contract, his fraud will
estop him from pleading his infancy to the prejudice of the other. Ferguson
v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121; Charles v. Hastedt, 51 N. J. E 171. But mere failure
to make known his age is not such a fraud as will justify equitable interfer-
ence with the common law rule. Baker v. Stone, 136 Mass. 4o5; Davidson v.
Young, 38 Ill. 145. If goods are obtained by an infant by fraudulent repre-
sentation as to his age, it is the better opinion that the other party may rescind
the contract and recover the goods. Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359; Neff
v. Landis, iio Pa. 2o4
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-AssuMPTION OF RISK.-
CENTRAL GRANARIES Co. v. AULT, io6 N. W. 418 (NEB.).-Held, that a ser-
vant, who from the length or character of previous service or experience,
may be presumed to know the ordinary hazards attending the proper conduct
of a certain business, is not entitled, as an absolute right, to the same or sim-
ilar notice of dangers incident to the employment, as if he was ignorant or
inexperienced in the particular work.
The facts in this case appear to preclude a negative influence from those
losses establishing the master's liability when he has failed to give proper
warning and notice when he knew of latent defects, Nason v. West, 78 Me.
253; or has furnished not reasonably safe machinery, Matthew v. Rilston,
156 W. S. 391; or when the master employs persons too young and inexperi-
enced to appreciate the dangers attending the work, Hays v. Colchester Mills,
69 Ver. I; or when the servant, knowing of the defects and dangers, has
continued at work without objection. Wloodley v. Metropolitan R. R. Co., L.
R. 2 Ex. D. 384. It is generally conceded in all jurisdictions that a servant
assumes the ordinary risks incidental to the work. Cooley on Torts, Sect.
552; Hayden v. Sinithville Manf. Co., 29 Conn. 548. The master can not
send the servant into new and dangerous work without instructions, but if
the dangers are obvious and familiar, a servant can not demand instruction
as to it, Bergen v. St. Paul Ry. Co., 38 N. W. 814 (Minn); or if the dan-
gers incidental are patent to every one or could have been seen by the servant,
had he used reasonable care, then the master is not liable. Welsh v. Bath
Iron Works, 98 Me. 361.
NuISANcE-AcTioN FOR DAMAGES-NEGLIGENCE-STOKES V. PENNSYL-
VANIA R. Co., 63 ATm. Io28 (PENN.).-Held, that in an action for damages
occasioned by the maintenance of a nuisance, the question of negligence is
not involved.
This case is strictly in line with the rules laid down in most jurisdictions.
Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. St. 257. As long as nuisance is not committed a
person may, if he exercises due care, use his property as he sees fit. But
when damage is a necessary consequence the question of negligence does not
apply but the law of nuisance does. Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas Light Co., 25
N. E. 246 (N. Y.). The exception to this rule is in the case of authorized
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public works. In this case negligence must be 
alleged in order to make out a




GOODWIN ET UX. V. CENTRAL R. R. OF NEW JERSEY, 
64 ATL. REP. i 34.- Where
a train ran into the hind wheel of a wagon passing 
over a railroad crossing,
held, that in view of the positive testimony of 
the plaintiff that the statutory
signals were not given, corroborated by circumstantial 
testimony, that ques-
tion should have been submitted to the jury, notwithstanding 
the positive tes-
timony of the defendant's witnesses to the contrary. 
Gummer, C. J., and
Reed, Green, Gray and Dill, JJ., dissenting.
Where several witnesses testify that an engine 
bell was ringing as the
train approached the crossing, and one witness 
who was in a position to hear,
testifies that he did not hear the bell rung, the 
question whether the bell was
rung must be submitted to the jury. Atchison, T. 
& S. F. R. Co. v. Feehan,
149 I11. 2o2. So, where persons near the 
track did not hear any signals and
certain members of the train crew testified that 
the bell was rung, it was
decided that it was a question of fact for the jury. 
Reed v. Chicago, St. P.
and M. & 0. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa i88; McDuffie v. 
Lake Shore and M. S. Ry.
Co., 98 Mich. 356. For, the position and situation of 
the witnesses, the atten-
tion they were giving, and their credibility, are questions 
for the jury, and
hence it is proper to submit to them the ultimate 
fact as to whether or not
the bell was ringing. Murray v. Missouri Pac. Ry. 
Co., 101 Mo. 236. And,
in such a case, where conflicting testimony is given 
on both sides, the determi-
nation of the question is for the jury. Ernst v. Hudson River 
R. Co., 24
Howard Practice 97; 32 Howard Practice, 262.
RAILROAD---CRosSING ACCIDENT-CoNTRIBUTORY 
NFIGLIENcE.-LEGANo v.
NEW YORK CENT. AND H. R. R. Co.--99 N. Y. Supp. 
iio3. Where, in an
action for injuries to a girl five years and ten months 
old, who was struck by
a locomotive at a crossing, it did not appear from 
any of the plaintiff's evi-
dence that she looked in the direction from whence 
the locomotive approached,
or that she exercised any care, held that there 
should have been a non-suit.
Spring & Kruse, JJ., dissenting.
A child must exercise such care and diligence at a railway 
crossing as
would reasonably be expected from its age and intelligence 
at the time. Bal-
timnore & 0. Ry. Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md. 378. Nor could the 
child recover if it
failed in this, even though the jury should find negligence 
on the part of the
defendant. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co. v. Breinig, supra. It has 
been held that
a child seven years of age, could not be deemed, as a matter 
of law, to be sui
juris so as to be chargeable with negligence, but that it presented 
a question
for the jury. Stone v. Dry Dock Ry. Co., 115 N. Y. io4. A 
child four or five
years is not, as a matter of law, chargeable with contributory negligence, 
and
barred from recovery in action brought by him, because he did 
not exercise
reasonable care to avoid injury. Westbrook v. Mobile & Ohio 
Ry. Co., 66
Miss. 56o. The child's capacity is always the measure 
of his responsibility
and if he has not the ability to foresee and avoid danger, negligence 
will
never be imputed to him. Philadelphia Ry. Co. v. Layer, 112 Pa. St. 414.
STREET RAILROADS-INJURIES TO PEDESTRIANS-CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENcE
-DEFECTIVE HEARING.-ADAMS v. BOSTON & N. ST. RY. C.-78 N. E. 117
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(MAss.).-Where deceased, at the time he was killed while walking on
defendant's street car track, was 78 years of age and very deaf, held, his want
of hearing made it incumbent on him to be more alert in the use of his other
senses.
It is not, as a matter of law, negligence for a man 79 years old, blind in
one eye and of defective hearing, to drive unattended on a public street.
Robbins v. Springfield Street Ry. Co., 165 Mass. 30. Nor is it necessarily
negligence for a blind person to be unattended on the street. Smith v.
Wildes, 143 Mass. 556. The test in such cases is: Under the special circum-
stances what care is reasonably necessary to insure safety? Neff v. Wellesley,
2 L. R. A. 5oo. An infirm person must use such care as one with such infir-
mity and conscious of it should use. Cleveland C. & C. R. Co. v. Terry, 8 0.
St. 57o. The extent of care is greater for a person suffering from an infirmity
to avoid danger. Mark's Adt'r v. R. R. Co., 88 Va. i.
TELEGRAPHS-DELAY IN DELnvERY OF MESSAGE-DAMAGES FOR MENTAL
SUPFERN.-GERocH V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH Co., 54 S. E. 782 (N. C.).
-Held, that where, by reason of defendant's delay in delivery of a telegram
announcing plaintiff's illness to her husband, the addressee was detained for
nearly two days in reaching her bedside and the plaintiff testified that the
delay caused her great anxiety, mental suffering, and a nervous chill, whether
damages were recoverable for the defendant's negligence in addition to the
price of the telegram was for the jury.
This case holds with the minority rule that in some cases damages are
recoverable for mental suffering. In most of the states the rule is that dam-
ages are not recoverable for mental suffering alone. Chase v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 44 Fed. 554. The first departure in any way from the rule was
made by allowing mental agony to increase the damage resulting from physi-
cal injury. Phillips v. Hoyle, 4 Gray 568 (Mass.).-Texas in I88I first
extended this rule and allowed recovery for mental suffering alone when
occasioned by delay in the delivery of a telegram. So. Relle v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 55 Texas 308. A minority of the states has followed
this holding. Green v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 136 N. C. 489. It
must be apparent on the face of the message that delay in delivery will cause
mental suffering. Western Union Telegraph Co. v Warren, 36 S. W. 3r4
(Tex.). A few jurisdictions limit the right of recovery to the sender.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 5io. The law of the
state to which the message is sent will govern whether a recovery shall be had
or not. Gray v. Tel. Co., 91 Am. St Rep. 7o6.
